After reading George Perkovish's article entitled, "Stopping the Iranian Bomb – Part II" this morning, I discovered that Iran is actually playing a dangerous game of truth or dare with the international community. The two parties involved in deciding whether Iran should tell the truth or force the dare are, of course, the United States and Europe on one side, and the Russians and Chinese on the other.
Iran's present diplomatic strategy is one of effective belligerence in an attempt to test how far the United States and Europe will go before it takes serious action against Tehran. Thus far, this coalition desires Iran to tell the truth about its nuclear intentions, but at present, is wary of the repercussions of the dare (UN sanctions that would ultimately lead to higher gas prices at home and more instability in the region).
On the other hand, Russia and China also want Iran to tell the truth about its nuclear program, as suggested by Russian President Putin's offer to enrich uranium for Iran in Russian territory, but are afraid of choosing the dare (imposing sanctions) as it would force Moscow and Beijing to sever economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran. This would result in Moscow losing a viable weapons buyer and Beijing out of a much needed energy supplier.
For Iran, keeping the other parties guessing its intentions would be its best strategy. In fact, Tehran doesn't want to tell the truth nor does it want the dare. Tehran understands that telling the truth (or disarming) would only play into the hands of the Americans and Europeans, which means abandoning its quest to produce nuclear technology on its own, while accepting the dare (sanctions) would compel its high level government officials to dismiss IAEA inspectors. This act would signal to the international community that Iran had something to hide all along (its intention to actually use nuclear technology for the development of weapons). Furthermore, Iran knows that expelling the IAEA inspectors would isolate it from its empathizers in Russia and China. This would further legitimize sanctions as Russia and China would ally themselves with Europe and the United States in solidifying the UN Security Council's decision to impose sanctions and force Iran to tell the truth. That scenario would pit Tehran against the international community, and that would be a lose-lose situation for President Ahmadinejad and Tehran.
For Tehran, the present strategy is to hold out; pitting both parties against each other to buy more time and leverage to leave the game altogether. In fact, Tehran is presently implementing this strategy as cited by its recent attempts to expose Washington's close ties with Israel, by allowing that country to possess nuclear weapons (though Israel has not formally denied or admitted it has nuclear weapons under the NPT) in an attempt to damage the United States' already battered image around the world while deflecting the issue from Iran's nuclear program to the United States' credibility. In order to maintain the status quo, Iran must also continue to play the role of the victim, as it possesses the right under the NPT to produce nuclear technology for peaceful means. Maintaining this image keeps Russia and China in limbo in their policy towards Iran, which plays very much to President Ahmadinejad's advantage, preventing the international community from taking action.
The international community's game plan to ameliorate this already tenuous situation must be to strengthen the activities of the IAEA (see last post) and build consensus in the UNSC, which means bringing Russia and China into the bandwagon. In order to convince Russia and China, Mr. Perkovish suggests that the UNSC must lay out a specific strategy to make Tehran look like the aggressor and not the victim. By magnifying Tehran's belligerence and showing the world that it is not in step with the international community's demands, Moscow and Beijing would have no choice but join the United States and Europe to exert pressure on Tehran. In fact, Tehran has indirectly helped the international community in this objective. President Ahmadinejad's incendiary remarks have only continued to fuel distrust of the Iranian government, and Tehran's recent refusal over Russia's proposal to enrich uranium in Russian territory has placed Iran's intentions into serious question.
So how does UNSC pursue to diffuse this situation? Mr. Perkovish suggests the following:
"In the coming days, European and US leaders should clarify, when Iran’s nuclear case is sent to the Security Council, that the Council’s demand on Iran be straightforward and non-punitive: Iran should resume suspension of activities related to producing fissile materials as long as the IAEA cannot resolve unanswered questions as to whether Iran’s nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. To enable the IAEA to do its job, the Council should mandate, under Chapter VII, that Iran satisfy the IAEA’s call for improved and timely access to sites, individuals, and original files.
"The goal is to induce the Iranian public and a core group of leaders to end their country’s isolation and integrate into the international system, and to show that this will happen if Iran foregoes acquiring inherently dual-use nuclear capabilities and ceases supporting organizations that conduct terrorism. To achieve this, Iranians must see that the world is unusually united. A non-punitive Security Council resolution will carry this message better than a sanctions-heavy resolution, infeasible anyway, because Iran’s radicals would rally less resistance to an international community that is acting temperately. If Iran rejects the terms of even a temperate resolution, then China and Russia and other Security Council members would be more willing to ratchet up the pressure. And when the ratchet turns due to Iranian belligerence or unreasonableness, internationalists competing for power in Tehran would have a stronger basis for demanding changes in their government’s course."
Inclusion to the international community and pressure by the UNSC along with the IAEA would bring Iran in line according Mr. Perkovish. If there is one advice I would suggest to diplomats and policymakers dealing with this situation, it would be to not impose sanctions but rather exercise patience. The steps to sanctions are a long one as outlined by BBC's Paul Reynold's article. There are better and more peaceful options as George Perkovich and Pierre Goldschmidt suggest. The international community, however, must be swift to act upon their recommendations.
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