Former US Army general and supreme allied commander of NATO, Wesley Clark lambasted President Bush's plan to deploy an additional 21,000 troops to Iraq in the op-ed he wrote today titled in the Sacramento Bee as "Diplomacy as the Last Surge". But could the general have jumped the gun?
In the letter, General Clark argued that the president's plan is shortsighted and will only be a temporary fix, citing that "increased troop presence [will] initially frustrate...militias, [but] wouldn't be long before they found ways...to continue the conflict." Rather, General Clark suggested diplomacy as the key. General Clark identified the current situation in Iraq as a political and not a military problem.
As mentioned in my previous posts, the US must use diplomacy to help the Iraqis build a unitary government and they have done so since 2003 under Paul Bremmer III. If, however, the end to build that government involves choosing sides as I mentioned in my last post, then the military option cannot be ignored. The president's proposal of increasing troop levels—which he will address tonight—may mean that he is choosing Prime Minister al-Maliki's side. Let me explain in greater detail.
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Supporting al-Maliki means eliminating al-Sadr. Translation: military action against al-Sadr is required.
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The US, since 2003, has invested billions of dollars in helping the Iraqis form a unitary government, from setting up the Iraqi preliminary government to holding elections. Currently, the State Department is working with Iraqi officials in creating a fair system of dividing Iraq's oil reserves proportionally so as to include the minority Sunnis to the table. This would be an important step to build trust among the Kurds, Shias and Sunnis, and towards a unitary government. I believe the administration firmly believes that only through a unitary government will the current state of sectarian violence on the ground be curbed.
Forming a unitary government can only be done by bolstering al-Maliki’s political position in the Iraqi parliament. This is easier said than done since the Shia majority is also divided within as Muqtada al-Sadr and his faction wait along the sidelines to break away from the government. Supporting al-Maliki then means eliminating al-Sadr. Translation: military action against al-Sadr is required.
While the media has not reported it directly, CNN's military strategists have already circled in their fancy Google-Earth Iraqi map Sadr City as the next major area of confrontation where these 21,000 troops will be conducting military operations. This could only mean one thing. The US will attempt to root out Muqtada al-Sadr's heavily-armed Mahdi militia. If this military operation is successful, the US will not have only eliminated a group that it considered a threat to obstructing Iraq's plans in forming a unitary government but it will also eliminate al-Maliki's major political nemesis in the Iraqi parliament. As a result, eliminating al-Sadr would give al-Maliki major political leverage which I believe the administration is gambling on to happen. Success over al-Sadr would pave the way for al-Maliki to form an Iraqi unitary government. The question now stands: will 21,000 US troops be enough to take out al-Sadr? Will Pelosi, Ted Kennedy and the Dems put up the money for this deployment? Will the American people buy it? We will see.
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Wednesday, January 10, 2007
Thursday, January 04, 2007
Choosing Sides In Iraq
What is the difference between the Kurds, Shias, Sunnis and the Iraqi government? The difference is that the latter doesn't really exist (while the Bush Administration claims that it does) while the former sectarian groups are vying for political power through means of violence.
In other words, Iraq is truly in a state of civil war. Ivo H. Daalder, a senior correspondent from the Brookings Institution addressed the salient part of the issue when he posed this question on his blog: "[T]he questions for President Bush is this: Which side in Iraq's civil war are we going to back decisively?"
Answering this critical question will pave the way for a decisive new policy in Iraq. The current debates of whether we should increase troop levels and intensify military training for Iraqi soldiers will not address the current problem of sectarian violence, as the ISG had suggested, but will in fact exacerbate it. The fact is, as we train Iraqi police and soldiers (predominantly Shia) and transfer power to them, many exploit the training they received by attacking Sunni dominated areas of the country. The Sunni, to no surprise, retaliate using guerilla tactics, i.e. masquerading in Iraqi police uniforms and perform brutal mass executions of Shias. The stark reality is that our efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government have only exacerbated the sectarian violence in the region. In fact, the administration’s indecisiveness in answering the above question have placed our military in the middle of the violence, as Shias and Sunnis continue their tit-for-tat attacks making it more difficult for the already fragile Iraqi government to achieve unity.
Our response to the growing violence was to hold the Al-Maliki/Talabani government accountable to stop the violence. What most Americans do not know is that Prime Minister Al-Malaki does not wield tremendous political power. On the contrary, Al-Maliki was elected to the office as a political compromise between the members of the Iraqi parliament. Therefore, for us to tell Al-Maliki to stop the violence would be like for us to tell a person to stop a train traveling sixty-miles per hour to stop on a dime. It's simply not going to happen. Furthermore, how can a government that has resorted to a futile "forgive, forget, and stop the violence" campaign for reconciliation is going to stop the violence? It will not.
The question for the president is how he will stabilize Iraq. In order to do that he must inevitably choose which side we are going to back. Mr. Daadler writes:
"So who do we want to win — the minority Sunnis who ran Iraq through brutal repression or the majority Shiites, many of whom are allied with Iran and not a few of whom are more interested in establishing theocratic rule than open and transparent government?"
As the US moves forward in this next chapter in Iraq, it must be wary how it proceeds. The hope of forming a unitary government grows dim as violence increase. Choosing sides will have major political ramifications and change the geopolitics in the region. Backing the Shia will mean allowing Iran and Syria to exert their influence in the country. Backing the Sunni will have the opposite effect but will pacify the moderates in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Helping back the Kurds will sour our relations with Turkey. Backing any sectarian group will not be to Israel's liking. Backing no one at all will surely leave a vacuum in the region that may well become a haven for terrorists. Mr. Daadler ends it best when he said, "What we cannot and must not do is to pretend that we don't have to make a choice."
To read Mr. Daadler's post, click here.
Technorati Tags:
Iraq Study Group
Iraq
Democrats
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Bush Administration
In other words, Iraq is truly in a state of civil war. Ivo H. Daalder, a senior correspondent from the Brookings Institution addressed the salient part of the issue when he posed this question on his blog: "[T]he questions for President Bush is this: Which side in Iraq's civil war are we going to back decisively?"
Answering this critical question will pave the way for a decisive new policy in Iraq. The current debates of whether we should increase troop levels and intensify military training for Iraqi soldiers will not address the current problem of sectarian violence, as the ISG had suggested, but will in fact exacerbate it. The fact is, as we train Iraqi police and soldiers (predominantly Shia) and transfer power to them, many exploit the training they received by attacking Sunni dominated areas of the country. The Sunni, to no surprise, retaliate using guerilla tactics, i.e. masquerading in Iraqi police uniforms and perform brutal mass executions of Shias. The stark reality is that our efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government have only exacerbated the sectarian violence in the region. In fact, the administration’s indecisiveness in answering the above question have placed our military in the middle of the violence, as Shias and Sunnis continue their tit-for-tat attacks making it more difficult for the already fragile Iraqi government to achieve unity.
Our response to the growing violence was to hold the Al-Maliki/Talabani government accountable to stop the violence. What most Americans do not know is that Prime Minister Al-Malaki does not wield tremendous political power. On the contrary, Al-Maliki was elected to the office as a political compromise between the members of the Iraqi parliament. Therefore, for us to tell Al-Maliki to stop the violence would be like for us to tell a person to stop a train traveling sixty-miles per hour to stop on a dime. It's simply not going to happen. Furthermore, how can a government that has resorted to a futile "forgive, forget, and stop the violence" campaign for reconciliation is going to stop the violence? It will not.
The question for the president is how he will stabilize Iraq. In order to do that he must inevitably choose which side we are going to back. Mr. Daadler writes:
"So who do we want to win — the minority Sunnis who ran Iraq through brutal repression or the majority Shiites, many of whom are allied with Iran and not a few of whom are more interested in establishing theocratic rule than open and transparent government?"
As the US moves forward in this next chapter in Iraq, it must be wary how it proceeds. The hope of forming a unitary government grows dim as violence increase. Choosing sides will have major political ramifications and change the geopolitics in the region. Backing the Shia will mean allowing Iran and Syria to exert their influence in the country. Backing the Sunni will have the opposite effect but will pacify the moderates in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Helping back the Kurds will sour our relations with Turkey. Backing any sectarian group will not be to Israel's liking. Backing no one at all will surely leave a vacuum in the region that may well become a haven for terrorists. Mr. Daadler ends it best when he said, "What we cannot and must not do is to pretend that we don't have to make a choice."
To read Mr. Daadler's post, click here.
Technorati Tags:
Iraq Study Group
Iraq
Democrats
US Foreign Policy
Bush Administration
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