What is the difference between the Kurds, Shias, Sunnis and the Iraqi government? The difference is that the latter doesn't really exist (while the Bush Administration claims that it does) while the former sectarian groups are vying for political power through means of violence.
In other words, Iraq is truly in a state of civil war. Ivo H. Daalder, a senior correspondent from the Brookings Institution addressed the salient part of the issue when he posed this question on his blog: "[T]he questions for President Bush is this: Which side in Iraq's civil war are we going to back decisively?"
Answering this critical question will pave the way for a decisive new policy in Iraq. The current debates of whether we should increase troop levels and intensify military training for Iraqi soldiers will not address the current problem of sectarian violence, as the ISG had suggested, but will in fact exacerbate it. The fact is, as we train Iraqi police and soldiers (predominantly Shia) and transfer power to them, many exploit the training they received by attacking Sunni dominated areas of the country. The Sunni, to no surprise, retaliate using guerilla tactics, i.e. masquerading in Iraqi police uniforms and perform brutal mass executions of Shias. The stark reality is that our efforts to strengthen the Iraqi government have only exacerbated the sectarian violence in the region. In fact, the administration’s indecisiveness in answering the above question have placed our military in the middle of the violence, as Shias and Sunnis continue their tit-for-tat attacks making it more difficult for the already fragile Iraqi government to achieve unity.
Our response to the growing violence was to hold the Al-Maliki/Talabani government accountable to stop the violence. What most Americans do not know is that Prime Minister Al-Malaki does not wield tremendous political power. On the contrary, Al-Maliki was elected to the office as a political compromise between the members of the Iraqi parliament. Therefore, for us to tell Al-Maliki to stop the violence would be like for us to tell a person to stop a train traveling sixty-miles per hour to stop on a dime. It's simply not going to happen. Furthermore, how can a government that has resorted to a futile "forgive, forget, and stop the violence" campaign for reconciliation is going to stop the violence? It will not.
The question for the president is how he will stabilize Iraq. In order to do that he must inevitably choose which side we are going to back. Mr. Daadler writes:
"So who do we want to win — the minority Sunnis who ran Iraq through brutal repression or the majority Shiites, many of whom are allied with Iran and not a few of whom are more interested in establishing theocratic rule than open and transparent government?"
As the US moves forward in this next chapter in Iraq, it must be wary how it proceeds. The hope of forming a unitary government grows dim as violence increase. Choosing sides will have major political ramifications and change the geopolitics in the region. Backing the Shia will mean allowing Iran and Syria to exert their influence in the country. Backing the Sunni will have the opposite effect but will pacify the moderates in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. Helping back the Kurds will sour our relations with Turkey. Backing any sectarian group will not be to Israel's liking. Backing no one at all will surely leave a vacuum in the region that may well become a haven for terrorists. Mr. Daadler ends it best when he said, "What we cannot and must not do is to pretend that we don't have to make a choice."
To read Mr. Daadler's post, click here.
Technorati Tags:
Iraq Study Group
Iraq
Democrats
US Foreign Policy
Bush Administration
No comments:
Post a Comment