Tuesday, January 31, 2006

The Time to Trust Hamas

While Hamas is considered a terrorist group, it did win a plurality (44%) though not a majority of the popular votes in the recent Palestinian elections. While our policy prohibits us from negotiating, or in this case, funding terrorists, it is becoming more apparent that we must make an exception in the case of Hamas.

The irony in this situation, which has probably got a lot of Washington officials scratching their heads, was that in our quest to support democratic elections, the Palestinian people voted in a party we didn’t approve of, the outcome of which had always been a risk in the democratic process. But now that Hamas has legitimately won authority, Washington and its allies must now proceed carefully in its dealings with Hamas.

In this post, I argue that the United States, Europe, the UN and Russia (the Quartet) should trust Hamas. While the Quartet should still be wary of Hamas’ extremist views which call for the dismantling of Israel, it must look forward to the possibility of building a more stable Palestinian government. Ironically, despite the Quartet’s (and the media’s) concerns over Hamas’ victory, Helen Cobban from the Christian Science Monitor argues that it may have brought us closer to peace.

Before I lay out some recommendations, it’s probably wise to give a brief background to explain why Hamas won and Fateh didn’t.

Fateh and the late Yassir Arafat had their chance to resolve their disputes against Israel under the Oslo Peace Accords and the subsequent “road map” to peace. Regrettably, Arafat’s stubbornness and poor leadership that prevented him to control his party led Fateh to ultimately fail in its goal to establish a free and independent Palestinian state. Furthermore, years of corruption and graft instilled by Arafat have only left the Palestinian people in poorer states and the situation with Israel at a standstill.

While Arafat exhausted all his means to stay in power, the Islamic Resistance Movement or Hamas, on the other hand, became a positive social force for all Palestinians. Hamas’ internal discipline allowed them to build hospitals and provide care for ordinary Palestinians. What Fateh couldn’t provide, stability and welfare, Hamas did. Thus, the election last week was not an aberration. The Palestinians believed it was time to change the status quo. They had had enough of the corruption and nepotism of Fateh, and as a result, they elected a new party who they believe would bring about real change.

As the media reports escalated violence between Fateh and Hamas’ respective supporters, it is incumbent upon the international community to intervene. Now that Hamas has legitimized itself as the majority party, it must be able assert itself in the political process. In order to do this, the Quartet must fund Hamas or face the repercussions of a Palestinian civil war.

Washington, while willing to support the secular Fateh, cannot turn its back on Hamas. The fact that Hamas only won 44% of the popular vote means that the party must cooperate with Fateh and other groups to actually get things done. Encouragingly, Ms. Cobban reports that Hamas’ leaders are in favor to form a national unity government, to work closely with President Mahmoud Abbas, and push for a cease-fire with Israel. Therefore, it would be in Washington’s best interest to fund Hamas, to muster all of its diplomatic resources to encourage all the parties involved (primarily Fateh and Hamas) to stop the violence and to take the battle into the political arena. This would be the first step to build a new, more stable and viable Palestinian government; a strong government that may be the key to move the peace process along.

The following are my recommendations that the Quartet should undertake:

1.) Recognize Hamas. The Quartet must eventually recognize Hamas. To not do so would undermine the election process and the will of the Palestinian people. The fact that Hamas only won 44% of the popular vote should reassure Washington that the party might moderate their views as it is forced to cooperate with other parties, including Fateh.

2.) Continue funding. The Quartet cannot afford to take sides between Fateh and Hamas. It must eventually fund all sides (all parties) that have a stake in building a stable and strong Palestinian government.

3.) Support dialogue between all parties, especially Fateh and Hamas. The Quartet should encourage all sides to end the violence and enter into negotiations in the building of a stable Palestinian government.

4.) Persuade Israel to recognize the new Palestinian government. Israel must also recognize Hamas’ victory. While this may remove Abbas as the key negotiator in the peace process, negotiating with a unified and stable Palestinian government is in Israel’s best interest as it will guarantee security during peace talks.

I encourage readers to read Helen Cobban’s article entitled "Hope for a Mideast resolution could grow with Hamas leadership.” There, Ms. Cobban eloquently describes the context of Hamas’ victory and outlines her own recommendations on international intervention.

While most of the media raises questions about Hamas' victory, I share Ms. Cobban’s optimism that it might actually be a step in the right direction. The key for the international community is once again patience and support.

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Thursday, January 26, 2006

A Sensible Solution to Solving Iran's Nuclear Program Dilemma

After reading George Perkovish's article entitled, "Stopping the Iranian Bomb – Part II" this morning, I discovered that Iran is actually playing a dangerous game of truth or dare with the international community. The two parties involved in deciding whether Iran should tell the truth or force the dare are, of course, the United States and Europe on one side, and the Russians and Chinese on the other.

Iran's present diplomatic strategy is one of effective belligerence in an attempt to test how far the United States and Europe will go before it takes serious action against Tehran. Thus far, this coalition desires Iran to tell the truth about its nuclear intentions, but at present, is wary of the repercussions of the dare (UN sanctions that would ultimately lead to higher gas prices at home and more instability in the region).

On the other hand, Russia and China also want Iran to tell the truth about its nuclear program, as suggested by Russian President Putin's offer to enrich uranium for Iran in Russian territory, but are afraid of choosing the dare (imposing sanctions) as it would force Moscow and Beijing to sever economic and diplomatic ties with Tehran. This would result in Moscow losing a viable weapons buyer and Beijing out of a much needed energy supplier.

For Iran, keeping the other parties guessing its intentions would be its best strategy. In fact, Tehran doesn't want to tell the truth nor does it want the dare. Tehran understands that telling the truth (or disarming) would only play into the hands of the Americans and Europeans, which means abandoning its quest to produce nuclear technology on its own, while accepting the dare (sanctions) would compel its high level government officials to dismiss IAEA inspectors. This act would signal to the international community that Iran had something to hide all along (its intention to actually use nuclear technology for the development of weapons). Furthermore, Iran knows that expelling the IAEA inspectors would isolate it from its empathizers in Russia and China. This would further legitimize sanctions as Russia and China would ally themselves with Europe and the United States in solidifying the UN Security Council's decision to impose sanctions and force Iran to tell the truth. That scenario would pit Tehran against the international community, and that would be a lose-lose situation for President Ahmadinejad and Tehran.

For Tehran, the present strategy is to hold out; pitting both parties against each other to buy more time and leverage to leave the game altogether. In fact, Tehran is presently implementing this strategy as cited by its recent attempts to expose Washington's close ties with Israel, by allowing that country to possess nuclear weapons (though Israel has not formally denied or admitted it has nuclear weapons under the NPT) in an attempt to damage the United States' already battered image around the world while deflecting the issue from Iran's nuclear program to the United States' credibility. In order to maintain the status quo, Iran must also continue to play the role of the victim, as it possesses the right under the NPT to produce nuclear technology for peaceful means. Maintaining this image keeps Russia and China in limbo in their policy towards Iran, which plays very much to President Ahmadinejad's advantage, preventing the international community from taking action.

The international community's game plan to ameliorate this already tenuous situation must be to strengthen the activities of the IAEA (see last post) and build consensus in the UNSC, which means bringing Russia and China into the bandwagon. In order to convince Russia and China, Mr. Perkovish suggests that the UNSC must lay out a specific strategy to make Tehran look like the aggressor and not the victim. By magnifying Tehran's belligerence and showing the world that it is not in step with the international community's demands, Moscow and Beijing would have no choice but join the United States and Europe to exert pressure on Tehran. In fact, Tehran has indirectly helped the international community in this objective. President Ahmadinejad's incendiary remarks have only continued to fuel distrust of the Iranian government, and Tehran's recent refusal over Russia's proposal to enrich uranium in Russian territory has placed Iran's intentions into serious question.

So how does UNSC pursue to diffuse this situation? Mr. Perkovish suggests the following:

"In the coming days, European and US leaders should clarify, when Iran’s nuclear case is sent to the Security Council, that the Council’s demand on Iran be straightforward and non-punitive: Iran should resume suspension of activities related to producing fissile materials as long as the IAEA cannot resolve unanswered questions as to whether Iran’s nuclear activities are solely for peaceful purposes. To enable the IAEA to do its job, the Council should mandate, under Chapter VII, that Iran satisfy the IAEA’s call for improved and timely access to sites, individuals, and original files.

"The goal is to induce the Iranian public and a core group of leaders to end their country’s isolation and integrate into the international system, and to show that this will happen if Iran foregoes acquiring inherently dual-use nuclear capabilities and ceases supporting organizations that conduct terrorism. To achieve this, Iranians must see that the world is unusually united. A non-punitive Security Council resolution will carry this message better than a sanctions-heavy resolution, infeasible anyway, because Iran’s radicals would rally less resistance to an international community that is acting temperately. If Iran rejects the terms of even a temperate resolution, then China and Russia and other Security Council members would be more willing to ratchet up the pressure. And when the ratchet turns due to Iranian belligerence or unreasonableness, internationalists competing for power in Tehran would have a stronger basis for demanding changes in their government’s course."

Inclusion to the international community and pressure by the UNSC along with the IAEA would bring Iran in line according Mr. Perkovish. If there is one advice I would suggest to diplomats and policymakers dealing with this situation, it would be to not impose sanctions but rather exercise patience. The steps to sanctions are a long one as outlined by BBC's Paul Reynold's article. There are better and more peaceful options as George Perkovich and Pierre Goldschmidt suggest. The international community, however, must be swift to act upon their recommendations.

Tuesday, January 24, 2006

UN Security Council Needs to Bolster IAEA

I wrote in my last post that one of the major hindrances preventing Iran from being referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC) are both Russia and China's close economic ties to Tehran (Russia in weapons, China in oil). It will be up to EU3 and United States to convince Russia and China that Iran is in fact, attempting to produce nuclear weapons.

Should China and Russia agree to bring Iran in front of the UNSC there is still the possibility that one or both could exercise their veto power preventing sanctions. If Russia or China should decide to exercise this authority, then the present situation in Iran remains in status quo. In other words, the situation doesn’t change. The IAEA would still consider Iran in violation of "non-compliance" under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and hostilities between Tehran and those who are opposed of Iran possessing nuclear capabilities will continue to escalate.

I proposed in my last post that the problem was with the UN and the subsequent divisions among its five permanent members, but after reading Pierre Goldschmidt's short, yet informative article titled, "The Urgent Need to Strengthen the Nuclear Non Proliferation Regime” published in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, I realized that my analysis was broad in scope.

While the solution also concerns the UNSC and the involved cooperation of its five permanent members, Mr. Goldschmidt, who by the way is the former Deputy Director General of the IAEA and head of its Department of Safeguards from 1999 to June 2005, suggests that the problem of nuclear nonproliferation could be solved in more peaceful terms. The solution would be to bolster the activities and effectiveness of the IAEA.

He recommends:

“action by the United Nations (UN) Security Council to adopt a generic binding resolution that would establish three peaceful measures for containing crises when a state is found by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations. These measures are strengthening the IAEA’s authority to conduct the inspections necessary to resolve uncertainties, deterring the noncompliant state from thinking it could withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and then enjoy the benefits of ill-gotten material and equipment, and suspending sensitive fuel-cycle-related activities in the state.”

In brief, Mr. Goldschmidt’s paper attributes the problems in North Korea and Iran stemming from the weaknesses of the NPT and the IAEA’s inadequate enforcement of its safeguard systems. This makes complete sense since the problem of nuclear nonproliferation starts from the IAEA’s inability to enforce its standards on non-compliant states. The international community, as Mr. Goldschmidt suggests, must “strengthen the authority of the IAEA to exercise its improved capacity in precisely the situations where it is most necessary: when a state has been found to be in non-compliance with its safeguard undertakings.”

I am not going into further details here; Mr. Goldschmidt does a more eloquent job in explaining the specifics. I welcome the reader to visit the above link.

The bottom line is that the trouble with the IAEA emerges as a systems problem. It highlights the growing importance of public administration in international and institutional studies, especially in a global world; tackling the problem at its origin before it escalates.

While Mr. Goldschmidt’s recommendations (to bolster the IAEA) may very well turn out to be the means to achieve a peaceful process in this already serious situation, it cannot be accomplished unless all five permanent members of the UNSC agree to it. Thus, this does not underscore the importance of cooperation among the five permanent members of the UNSC which still determines the stability of the world.

Thursday, January 19, 2006

A Divided United Nations

With the escalating hostilities increasing in Iran and North Korea, it is only a matter of time when the world will once again turn the spotlight on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the forum responsible for safeguarding the world’s security.

Likening the UN as a court, with the five permanent members of the UNSC, (United States, Russia, England, France, and China) representing the jury, the cases of Iran and North Korea continues to be deliberated even outside of the courtroom. Should it ever go to trial, there is no doubt, from this author’s mind, that the verdict will be split: the United States and Europe on one side and China and Russia on the other.

This split, (which constitutes the internal division in the UN) among the five permanent members reveals the UN’s most glaring institutional weakness. Without delving into institutional theory analysis, the problem with the UNSC is that it lacks any form of internal control, consistency and accountability among the five permanent members and does not provide incentives for them to compromise. While each member has veto power to check another, the UN, like the League of Nations that preceded it, lacks the ability to exercise power and authority over its members. For example, it did not stop the United States from taking unilateral military action against Saddam Hussein’s regime, nor has it been able to reform and effectively regulate the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in which several countries have taken advantage of its loopholes.

The problem with the UNSC is that unlike a jury, its five permanent members are not impartial. In making a decision, all have a stake in the outcome. Each government has its own national interest and political agenda they want to pursue in an attempt to steer the UN towards its desired course.

A closer examination of the nuclear weapons issue in Iran and North Korea clearly delineates the division among the five permanent members. In both cases, the UK, France and the United States want these countries to disarm while China and Russia lean more in support of Tehran and Pyongyang by encouraging diplomacy. Why? Because history and national interest has already made up each juror’s mind.

In the case of Iran, the EU3 (the UK, France and Germany) and the United States fundamentally distrust Tehran alleging its close ties to terrorist groups and fearing nuclear proliferation in the region. China and Russia, on the other hand, have a closer relationship with Tehran. Russia considers Iran a viable weapons buyer and has had a longstanding relationship with the country since the Iraq-Iran War. China maintains a close relationship with Tehran since it understands the strategic importance of tapping Iran's oil reserves to help it sustain its economic development.

Interestingly, the case with North Korea is similar and also reveals the same split among the five permanent members. Europe and United States call for North Korea to disarm, perceiving Kim Jong Il as a threat to the stability of the region while Russia and China have friendlier ties with Pyongyang. Whether it is the common bond of the old communist system they all once shared, it's obvious that Russia views Pyongyang as a viable trading partner while China considers it as one of its closest allies stemming back from the Korean War.


While the UN, in most people's eyes, represents a supranational institution capable of sustaining global leadership, in reality, only masquerades as a formal process, where the world can discuss but not actaully act upon its problems. The resolutions it ratifies, while recognized by the world, are loosely enforced.

Times have changed. Gone are the days of the Cold War where the United States and Soviet Union reigned supreme. This also marks in what I believe to be the beginning of the end of US supremacy in world affairs, as Washington slowly loses its influence to dictate its desired foreign policy to the world. The decision to go to war with Iraq may have been its last gasp as it continues to learn the repercussions of its decision ($200 billion and rising with 2200 of its soldiers dead and rising).

This new millennium has transformed the global geopolitical landscape. Once dominated by the United States as the world's only preeminent superpower for the past sixteen years after the fall of communism, we now enter a world of multi-power states, with the emergence of the EU, China and Russia; a landscape in which the world has not seen since the end of the nineteenth century. These countries’ newfound roles in the world stage have curtailed Washington’s influence and have dispersed power multilaterally. As a result, compromise among the five permanent members is more important than ever if the world is to maintain stability today. Unfortunately, divisions among these nations are slowly starting to unravel (as China secretly aids Pyongyang and Russia debates its position with Tehran) which may bring about a repeat of secret alliances and combinations common among the nineteenth century superpowers the years preceding WWI. It was to untangle these secret allainces that the League of Nations was created. Today, the world finds itself in a similar situation. This time the UN takes center stage and carries with it the burden of finding a resolution.

Sadly, it is an inadequate institution sorely in need of reform if it is to reconcile these differences and find solutions to the growing problem of nuclear proliferation. The next rounds fought in the UNSC will determine the institution's sustainability and hold with it the world's stability.





Saturday, January 14, 2006

World Affairs: A Week in Review

As a close observer of world affairs, I find that the events transpiring in the Middle East and other hot spots around the world troubling and should cause the American public to take pause. I outline the following as a brief recap of what’s happening around the world.

Iraq

Recent election results are believed to have increased the already fragile sectarian divisions in the country. The ratification of the new constitution hinges on the Shias and Kurds and their ability to give the Sunni minority sufficient authority in the new Iraqi government. If the US coalition fails in its attempt to encourage compromise among these groups in the constitutional process, then the possibility of a civil war increases.

Israel & Palestine

Due to Prime Minister Sharon’s debilitating stroke that has left him seriously incapacitated, acting Premier Ehud Olmert has the overwhelming responsibility of carrying out the talks with the Palestinians, which has led to positive outcomes in the peace process. However, without Sharon’s charismatic presence and direction, the continuance of the negotiations looms in doubt. Meanwhile, President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah, due to the lack of internal discipline within the group, is losing ground to Hamas who views Israel as a threat. Should Hamas win enough support during the Palestinian elections scheduled for January 25, the result may jeopardize the peace process.

Iran

The EU recently ended talks with Iran in regards to its alleged nuclear weapons program and is in the process of reporting it to the UN Security Council. The implications of sanctions against Iran are great for a region that has already suffered much turmoil. Sanctions would increase anti-US and anti-Israel sentiments in the region making it difficult for our troops to secure an already fragile Iraq.

North Korea

Multilateral talks have not resumed since November of last year. The US maintains its allegations that North Korea is pursuing illegal activities in counterfeit and money laundering in order to finance its nuclear weapons programs. Talks are at a standstill.

What these problems share is the possibility that the issues will be brought before the UN Security Council. Unfortunately, the UN, as an institution, has its own problems and may not offer the best of solutions. I will elaborate on this matter more in my next post.

In the meantime, it is imperative that the American public does not turn a blind eye to these matters. I invite the reader to further consider the importance of these events, the repercussions of which can make for a more destabilized world.

Wednesday, January 11, 2006

Schwarzenegger and Alito Go to the Middle

While reading through newspaper articles this morning about California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and judicial nominee Samuel Alito, I discovered they actually had more things in common and in fact share a similar plight.

Both are fighting for their political/judicial careers in the face of harsh criticisms from the Democrats. Both are the focal points of their respective constituencies. And both are attempting to pull off the same strategy in moving towards the middle: Schwarzenegger, in his recently proposed budget calling for increased spending, and Alito, in his judicial confirmation hearing, stated that he would keep an “open mind” in the issue of abortion.

I am not going to evaluate their specific policies or positions here, but explain more about the nature of politics. Why moving towards the middle make for an effective strategy for political players on one hand, and a political smokescreen for the American public, on the other?

What exactly are both Schwarzenegger and Alito doing? For the political novice, this means treading softly among the enemy’s den, or more accurately, political maneuvering. The only way to achieve political power in our government is to reassure and convince political opponents that we won’t trample on their interests. In order to placate both sides of the aisle, it becomes a political necessity for Schwarzenegger to prudently choose to cut or fund those programs that will make the least political wakes, and for Alito, to not reveal any position that may bias him in front of the Judiciary Committee and cost him senate approval votes.

As Americans, we elect our leaders because we trust them to make sound policy, to represent us fairly in the political process. We imbue the same faith in our judges (albeit, they are appointed) to be fair and thoughtful in their opinions when handing down legal decisions. Yet, in order to implement the budget, like in Schwarzenegger’s case, or to be confirmed a seat in the highest court in the land, in Alito’s case, it requires both to move towards the middle if they are to achieve political or judicial authority.

What does this mean to the American public? The consequences are apparent. Critics and pundits alike jibber-jabber about it all the time. “We’re not looking at the real issue here…what Alito will actually do,” a Harvard law professor told CNN’s Anderson Cooper, “the questioning [by the Judicial Committee]is partisan.” In the budget debate, similar rhetoric is used. While the interests are more diffused, they can still be delineated among party lines. The political process becomes a game of who can successfully jump more hoops or avoid being trapped by their political opponents. For the American people who admire and expect integrity, honesty and openness from government officials, this game has become extremely frustrating. As a result, the public becomes disillusioned by the process.

What the political process makes us lose sight of are the genuine intentions of the political actor. The mist of politics obfuscates what the real person would actually say or do. In the end, that is a shame. Unfortunately, it’s the reality of the political process; the natural consequences of Madison's Federalist 10 and 51, where he constructed an array of checks and balances and compromise begetting compromise.

I believe this is what turns a lot of Americans off about politics. They see the political process as a sham, and all politicians and judicial nominees are two-faced liars, unable to be trusted because it's all about winning the prize. But that’s the nature of politics. Not everyone will get everything they want, the perfect budget and justice not exluded. If you ever find yourself feeling this way, rest assure, our political system is most likely working the way it should.

Monday, January 09, 2006

It's China, Stupid!

So the title's not so civil, oh well. Do you know why North Korea has been out of the headlines lately? The answer is that Pyongyang has not been present in negotiations since November of last year. In fact, it has no intention of returning until the United States retract its recent sanctions and the allegations implicating North Korea of counterfeiting and money-laundering, which is presumably being used to fund its nuclear weapons programs. In other words, talks are at a standstill.

North Korea has been on the US watch list since 1982 when US satellites detected the construction of a small nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Since then, Pyongyang has been using its ability to build nuclear weapons as leverage against the international community to get support and aid. This led to the 1994 “nuclear freeze” negotiated by former President Jimmy Carter and former North Korean president Kim Il Sung, in which the United States, Japan and South Korea agreed to supply North Korea fuel oil and two large nuclear-power plants incapable of manufacturing weapons-grade materials in return for North Korea dismantling its nuclear weapons project (note that China was not part of this agreement).

The agreement lasted five years until 1999, when US intelligence reported that North Korea had enriched enough weapons grade plutonium to build a purported 50 bombs. The question is where and how they got it? This was the reason why President Bush in his State of the Union address in 2002 included North Korea as one of the countries included in the “axis of evil”. Around the same time the United States made preparations to invade Iraq, North Korea in April 2003, admitted in talks with China and the United States that it had in its possession a nuclear bomb and wanted to detonate it. Why would North Korea publicly disclose that it had weapons? Wouldn't that strike the reader odd and irrational? I believe that this public show by Pyongyang was a political ploy conceived by Beijing to convince Kim Jong Il to enter into China’s proposed six-nation multilateral talks in an attempt to protect North Korea from the United States, who at the time invaded Iraq. I believe that arranegment between Beijing and Pyongyang took place behind the scenes.

I recently took a political management class in which our professor taught us that in order to understand what’s truly happening in current events, one has to critically examine multiple sources and to do one’s own investigation to connect the dots. While journalists relay the news, (it’s important to remember Herbert Simon’s theory of satisficing: that one cannot know everything), individual journalists only write on the information they know best thereby limiting the context, unable to present the bigger picture. That’s why I find Google News fascinating. The ability to access information from the left and right and other news media sites around the world gives us the opportunity to examine for ourselves multiple perspectives. What makes the North Korea multilateral talks interesting is that there are six countries involved, all with varying self-interests and agendas.

The major players in these discussions are the United States and China. While there are only two players, we can delineate in fact three general coalitions.

The first coalition is made up of the United States and Japan who genuinely want to see North Korea disarm its weapons. The United States are pushing North Korea to disarm because of the Bush Doctrine, which calls for the elimination of WMD and Japan, because of its close proximity to North Korea, fears attack from the rogue nation. Not to mention that there still exist much dislike between the Koreans and the Japanese that stems back to World War II.

The second coalition is what I call the indifferent countries. These include South Korea and Russia. While South Korea would prefer a disarmed northern neighbor, it remains sympathetic to its northern brothers and sisters, never hesitating to appease it by sending aid, whether food or energy, when the North threatens force. That's not a surprise since both share an ethnic bond both. As a result, South Korea has never had enough courage to impose sanctions on North Korea and probably never will.

Russia is another player in the discussions who in reality is uninterested in the matter. While in face, Putin wants the United States to achieve its goal in disarming North Korea (he would rather have a neighbor without nuclear capabilities), Russia may in fact have a secret desire to see the United States fail in these multilateral talks, primarily because of Russia's falling out of the world stage after the fall of communism. There is basis for this assertion. Currently, Russia continues to sell arms to Iran, fueling the WMD crisis in that region, which also involves the United States, and recently, Putin signed and the Duma passed a federal act last December that solidified the relationship with North Korea by boosting common protection on investments. Russia really has no reason to help the United States and in all likelihood will remain neutral in the process.

The major player in this discussion whom I believe is really in control, but didn’t want to find themselves there is the first place, are China and North Korea. While China claims to have severed military ties with Pyongyang, that’s more a red herring than an affirmation. Their ties that stem back to the Korean War, where 300,000 Chinese soldiers sacrificed their lives cannot just be pushed aside. I believe that it was China, North Korea’s closest ally, who from the very beginning supplied the North with weapons and continues to do so for the purposes of increasing its sphere of influence (communism) and intimidating Taiwan. The problem was that North Korea got caught with the weapons; in 1982 by US surveillance satellites and in 1999 by US intelligence.

Is it pure coincidence that China proposed multilateral talks at the same time the US military was taking out Saddam’s regime? It’s no coincidence. China had to take action because it did not want its ally to suffer the same fate as Iraq. Fortunately for China, the US was not in a favorable position to open another front in the War on Terror.

Similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis when Khrushchev attempted to supply Castro’s regime with weapons, I believe Beijing wanted to do the same for North Korea. Unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, in which I believe Khrushchev all along wanted the weapons to be discovered to use as leverage to compel JFK to remove our nuclear weapons in Turkey, China does not have a bargaining chip. At the time when the US flexed its military power against Iraq in 2003, China, acted like a big brother trying to defend its little brother, stepped in North Korea’s defense by proposing multilateral talks, which was perhaps the best alternative the Chinese could think of, short of going to war.

Presently, we find the situation at a stalemate. I believe China holds the key to North Korea’s fate. Let’s examine China’s interests for the North: China wants North Korea to have stability. It doesn’t want the United States to get involved militarily against North Korea since a war will force millions of North Korea’s refugees into China. Yet, China wants to retain its ally in the Korean peninsula. That means that in face, China wants North Korea to disarm, but in reality, wants its ally to have nuclear capabilites.

Presently, the US alleges North Korea in money laundering and counterfeit, but isn’t it odd that the press is reluctant to reveal who North Korea’s partners are in this alleged dealings? The culprit is China, and because of our current economic ties with that country, it behooves the Bush Administration to not publicly accuse them, or at least not directly.

So, in reality, China is in control of the matter in the Korean peninsula. Big brother (China) helped little brother (North Korea) out, before the bully (the United States) stepped in and hadv its way. If China doesn’t come up with a starightforward policy that fully aims to disarm North Korea, they'll probably find the U.S. Seventh Fleet knocking on their doorstep.

Saturday, January 07, 2006

Pulling Out Our Troops? I Don't Think So

As I mentioned in my last post, perhaps the reason why the president shies away when asked about a timetable in leaving Iraq is because al Qaeda and other terrorists in the region are really the ones who truly dictate whether our troops stay or leave.

So I wasn't quite surprised when I turned on CNN to hear that top al Qaeda officials have just released a new tape declaring victory over the United States over the administration's recent announcement of decreasing troop levels in Iraq. The timing of the announcement couldn't have been more poignant as it comes after a day of escalated violence that killed 127 Iraqis by the hands of a few zealous suicide bombers.

So what does this mean for the future of Iraq and how does this affect our political and military position in the region? An interesting observation is that there is always an increase of violence after major triumphs achieved by the Iraqi government and this is becoming more and more of a trend. As the Iraqi government takes one step forward, i.e. the creation of a provisional government, government official elections, and now constitutional elections, the insurgents seem to always step up their attacks a few days after the pronounced achievements, attempting to convince the world, especially the American public, that progress has actually taken two steps back. It's an excellent strategy from the viewpoint of the terrorists. It's similar to someone who builds a sand castle and then some stranger comes along to maliciously tear it down. Those who spent a lot of time and effort building it are completely demoralized. How much more can the administration tolerate this? Not surprisingly, there are two perspectives on this matter.

The recent announcement by both the Bush Administration and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw regarding the pull out of troops from Iraq could mean two very disparate things. The first, or the more optimistic view, is that the Iraqi government is becoming more self-sufficient and independent to take care of its political and security needs. In fact, Jalal Talabani, the president of Iraq, has made a recent announcement that the new Iraqi government will be formed in a matter of weeks. If this is the case and we have trained a sufficient number of Iraqi security forces, then this would be the right time to decrease our troop levels. The second and more cynical view is that the terrorists are actually winning by thwarting the successes of the new government, thus preventing stability, and is forcing the administration's hand in pulling out of the region.

Regardless of the two above reasons, the US military can expect more of the same: more violence and disruptions. While there maybe troop reductions, it's unreasonable to believe that the numbers will be significant; insurgents will surely mount more attacks prompting President Bush to not back down which means that more troops will stay. This begs the question whether our troops are really coming home? One thing is for sure, the majority won't be coming home in the near future, or at least, not in the coming weeks.

Even if we capture or kill al Zarqawi and other insurgent leaders, it's unreasonable to think that the insurgents will drop their weapons or decide not to blow themselves up. There will always be others waiting along the sidelines willing to take their place. The only time when these insurgencies will stop is when all foreign troops have left Iraq. Unfortunately, without our protection, the new fledging government we helped to build won't survive if we pull our troops out all together.

The mission right now, as the president has continually said, is to do the best we can in building a secure and free Iraq; that means building a stable and independent government. With the last election only managing to inflame more sectarian divisions, especially among the Sunni minority, it appears we're not even close to building a constitutional government based on federalism and the rule of law. This will take time for sure, but not a matter of weeks.

Wednesday, January 04, 2006

The Bush Doctrine: Going Beyond Its Scope

As we approach the three year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, it maybe difficult for most to trace back and understand how we found ourselves there in the first place. It is confusing since the motivations and reasons given by the Bush Administration to the American people to justify the war have changed at every contingency.

After 9/11, the justification was that Saddam Hussein presumably had links to al Qaeda, linking him to the War on Terror (which was unsubstantiated). Then, a reason not linked at all to terrorism, the administration strategically decided that it would be the right time to tell the world that Saddam was refusing to abide by the UN resolutions, denying entrance to nuclear inspectors (the IAEI). This action prompted former Secretary of State Powell to testify in front of the UN Security Council about possible hidden weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Most recently, our failure to uncover WMD compelled President Bush to reaffirm his decision to depose Saddam Hussein from power, again citing his tyranny against his people as his main reason why the cause was just. Today, the administration relies on establishing freedom and a constitutional government in Iraq as the basis for our continued military presence in the region.

My intention in writing this post is to examine the evolution of the Bush Doctrine; to explain how we went from pursuing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Afghanistan to invading Iraq while simultaneously threatening North Korea and Iran in the process. In my analysis, I hope to illustrate and argue that the emergence of the Bush Doctrine purposefully and strategically broadened the definition of the War on Terror, thereby going beyond its scope, to include other enemies not necessarily linked to the 9/11 attacks, but enemies of the United States nonetheless. As a result, the Bush Doctrine completely redefined the War on Terror: broadening our list of potential enemies, turning it into a war of attrition without an end in sight.

From Terrorists to Iraq: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine

In order to understand this evolution, it is important to go back three years ago and examine two critical addresses given by President Bush in Congress. The first was given on September 20, 2001, a few days shortly following the attacks on 9/11. The other speech was the State of the Union address on January 2002 where the president articulated what will be known as the "Bush Doctrine". These two speeches are of great importance since they give insight into how the Administration, in the early days following the terrorist attacks, attempt to define their response and provide clues to the genesis of the strategy that would ultimately become our foreign policy against terrorism. The first speech, known now at the White House website as the "Freedom of War with Fear", the president clearly identified (in my opinion, quite eloquently) the real enemy in the War on Terror: al Qaeda.

"Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda...This group and its leader -- a person named Osama bin Laden -- are linked to many other organizations in different countries...They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction."

The speech articulated who the enemy was (al Qaeda), where the enemy would be (Afghanistan) and its supporter (the Taliban). If taken into proper context, the War on Terror's objectives were clearly identified and articulated. We were going into Afghanistan, have a quantitative method of measuring success in the number of al Qaeda leaders and members we arrest or kill and have the tools to develop a reasonable exit strategy out of Afghanistan. It also clearly stated the methods to hunt down al Qaeda members elsewhere by pursuing every means necessary "to...defeat...the global terror network." But the speech also left a critical loophole:

"Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."

The explanation for this statement, with the benefit of hindsight we know now to be true, was the Administration's desire to leave the question of the policy against terrorism open-ended. Nevertheless, that speech, which will probably go down in history as President Bush's best speech, mentioned nothing about rogue nations, regimes, or weapons of mass destruction. The enemy was only Osama bin Laden and his global terrorist network.

Rogue nations, regimes, weapons of mass destruction, which can be aptly summarized as "the axis of evil" were only first disclosed in President Bush's next major speech, or the State of Union address, delivered four months after the "Freedom of War with Fear" speech. It was this speech that the president decided to elaborate more on his policy against terrorism. In an almost invisible and yet clever way, the president rhetorically tied fighting against al Qaeda in the Philippines, Pakistan and Bosnia to those governments that were lackadaisical about terrorism or that were unwilling to join us in our War on Terror stating:

"But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will."

It is at this moment where the president articulates his policy which will be known as the Bush Doctrine. At the heart of the policy, he chooses to categorize any regime that sponsors terror just as culpable as the terrorists themselves and includes those governments possessing weapons mass destruction in the same category. At that moment, the Bush Doctrine was established as the policy that would drive the War on Terror. As a result, President Bush mentions North Korea and their armaments, Iran in their support of terrorists, and for the first time, we hear of Iraq: its plot to develop WMD and its supposed link to al Qaeda and terrorism.

In a matter of four months, between these two speeches, we went from declaring war against al Qaeda to those regimes that support them. In other words, more specifically, declared war on those groups and governments who have interests that are not favorable to our own. The Bush doctrine went beyond its scope. Rather than fighting those directly responsible for the attacks on 9/11, the Bush Doctrine pretentiously declared war on everyone else who supported terrorism or those who oppose America and its values. The Bush Doctrine, in defining the War on Terror as "us versus them", has inadvertently made it a war of ideology between democracy and fundamentalist (extremist) Islamic thought. This is the reason why I believe the average American is confused in trying to find the connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The fact is that there is none. And it is no surprise that we have seen the administration for the past three years continue to attempt to convince the American people that there is a link among Saddam's regime and al Qaeda or that it has possession of WMD. For the most part until recently with the intelligence debacle, the administration has been able to make that argument stick. It was this point, that there was no connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, that Senator John Kerry failed to clearly articulate during the presidential election in 2004.

For Our Enemies Only

The Bush Doctrine, while going beyond its scope has also limited other governments from usrping it. Let's take Israel for example. The Bush Doctrine, on face value, should have given Ariel Sharon precedent to use force against the Palestinians, whom the Israelis consider as terrorists. If the policy is interpreted in the literal sense, Israel could take any action it deems necessary to protect its own security--to freely eliminate the Palestinians. If the Bush Doctrine ostensibly has given Sharon precedent to do whatever he wants, how did Secretary of State Rice persuade the conservative and hawkish Sharon from using force and then broker instead a deal to give control of the Gaza over to the Palestinians?

While the Bush Doctrine may appear to advocate regime vigilantism, it actually limits which regimes could be targeted. In this case, those who fall into the category of the "axis of evil" are those governments who illegally possess, are trying to posses, or proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The Palestinians, on the other hand, possess small arms, sticks and stones, and not WMD. It is my belief that Secretary of State Rice was successful in persuading Ariel Sharon to back down (and there is no question Israel possesses sufficient military might to eliminate the Palestinians) from starting a full-scale war against the Palestinians because of the difference in context stipulated in the Bush Doctrine. In this case, only the United States has the legitimate authority to effectively utilize the Bush Doctrine.

Bush Doctrine Tailored for Iraq?

Interestingly, this has got me thinking whether the Bush Doctrine was specifically tailored for Iraq. The more and more I thought about it, the more rational it was to me why the Bush Doctrine was designed the way it was. While 9/11 gave the administration legitimate reason to hunt down the terrorists, specifically al Qaeda, it is likely that those around Bush's circle at the time, (we all know who they are) Cheney, Rumsfeld and even Colin Powell saw 9/11 as a way to broaden the policy's scope to include our other enemies, mainly Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.

Everyone around Bush's circle, including Bush himself had reason to take down Saddam Hussein. The reason stems back to the first Gulf War. In 1991, Vice President Cheney was the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State Powell was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and both, as heads of the military operation in charge of the Persian Gulf War, were in no doubt frustrated that Saddam was allowed to retain power after the conflict. While Donald Rumsfeld remained in the private sector in 1991, as President Ford's former Chief of Staff and Secretary of State from 1975 to 1977, he witnessed the Socialist reforms being implemented by the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. There is no doubt in my mind that he was concerned about a rising socialist state within the Middle East in the middle of the Cold War, and having met with Saddam Hussein himself, Rumsfeld may have not held Saddam in high esteem. In 1991, current President George W. Bush supported his father in the victory in the Persian Gulf but clearly the attempted assassination of his father's life in Kuwait City shortly following the war instilled in him a personal resentment towards Saddam Hussein. Clearly, the Bush Administration from the very beginning had Iraq on its agenda.

Though it is speculation on my part, I believe the caveat on WMD was intended solely to deal with the Iraqi problem in the administration's eyes. If that was the administration's intent, then it worked only part way. Inevitably, we would enter Iraq without backing from the UN and to the censure of allies, France and Germany being the most prominent.

The Implications of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine, since becoming policy has opened a Pandora's Box. We have decided to not only take on the terrorists but also those who support them. While the logic behind the Bush Doctrine makes sense, to use the analogy of killing a tree: it is better to tear its roots (stop its supporters) than hack off its branches (killing individual terrorists) to prevent other branches from growing, its logic (stopping al Qaeda/terrorism), however, does not work if we are hacking the wrong tree (in Iraq). Instead of pursuing al Qaeda in their own turf, we have invited them (al Zarqawi and friends) into Iraq where they contribute to much of the violence and instability, preventing us in fulfilling our own objectives in building a stable and free Iraq. While the president still claims that the decision to invade Iraq was the right choice since we are fighting the terrorist over there and not here at home, the fact is that we have just stirred the hornet's nest by inviting al Qaeda and other terrorists groups into Iraq. Rather than our troops being on the offensive, we are on the defensive, attempting to build and safeguard a government left by the political vacuum we created when deposing Saddam's regime. This may sound critical, but perhaps the reason why the president shies away when asked about a timetable in leaving Iraq is because al Qaeda and other terrorists in Iraq are really the ones who truly dictate whether our troops stay or leave.

While the Bush Doctrine assumes that you can't defeat the terrorist without also confronting the governments that support them, and this makes sense logically, one must admit that it has laid out a more difficult challenge for the United States in winning the War on Terror. Rather than limiting the scope, targeting specifically those terrorists who plotted the attacks on 9/11, we have taken upon ourselves, as a nation, the burden of eliminating all those we deem as foreign threats. Furthermore, we must identify the threat before it comes into fruition--the policy of pre-emption. As a result of the Bush Doctrine, on March 2003, we marched into Iraq unilaterally, based on flawed intelligence that there were weapons of mass destruction, without UN support, made up of only the "coalition of the willing", focused solely on deposing Saddam Hussein, and lacking a preconceived and well-thought exit strategy.

So that's where we find ourselves in Iraq today, our brave military fighting for the cause of freedom and liberty with death causalities nearing 2,200 of our finest young men and women in uniform.

Some Points to Ponder

So has the Bush Doctrine gone beyond its scope in the way that I defined it? Has President Bush, in setting out his policy that fateful day in January of 2002, make the right decision to define The War on Terror in the context of us against them? I wrote this post of the opinion that the Bush Doctrine did go beyond its scope, to explain why we ended up there and why we now face the complex challenges in Iraq.

In the end, I feel that the Bush Doctrine forced us into britches that were a little too big for us to fit. It has made measuring success in the War on Terror more difficult. It is one in which all succeeding presidents (should they decide to continue the policy) must call for continued patience, vigilance and more sacrifice of blood and national treasure. It has become a war in which Iraq, I fear, is only the beginning while North Korea and Iran wait nervously along the sidelines. It has made the War on Terror a war without timetables, one clearly lacking a definite end.

We've had three years to reflect. I welcome your comments.

This Purpose In Mind

After Dan Rather was booted from his coveted anchor position from CBS's Evening News because of his failure to verify a news source, which the world now knows was exposed by a maven bloggerite, I decided that it might behoove me (as a student of politics and international relations) to join in the fun in the bloggesphere.

I suppose my decision to start a blog really didn't stem from the necessity to have an outlet to tell the world what my opinions are or how I feel about certain somethings, but really came from my curiosity to comment about today's current events; to have an opportunity to really ponder what the news mean to me, my family and community.

In thinking about my approach for this blog, I began to think about how I could make the time I spend writing it beneficial to me and those who read it. Thinking about this blog reminded me of how truly privileged we are to live in a country where we, as citizens, have a right to voice our opinions and concerns. However, in today's world where the overall spectrum of media news have run a muck attempting to vie for our every attention and even win influence over our very conscience, I believe that most people (professionals and academics not excluded) have lost their ability to critically think about the news for themselves. The media with its ability to frame news stories in such a way to bias it is apparent everytime one turns on the television. Take FOX News for example, who ironically, for some reason calls their journalism "fair and balanced" when it is apparent that the station leans further right from the center. Please let me not single out FOX News alone before the reader accuses the author to be a liberal, but every news outlet is culpable: CNN, Al Jezeera, and even PBS. There will always be bias no matter what news is reported since stories are interpreted differently and the words that are used to report them are always laden with value-judgments. This prompted NPR to hire an ombudsman in response to CPB's accusation of its middle to left stance, but that is beside my point. (For more on the framing issues, read The Language of Politics, by Adrian Beard)

My point is that most people (including myself at times) do not critically examine what is really being written or said on the news. As a result, for the average American who is busy raising a family, paying off a mortgage and working a job(s) accepts what he or she hears on the news, written in the newspapers, as fact, and unfortunately, is unable to readily distinguish what is fact from opinion.

Let me give a personal example. I was over at my wife's parent's home to celebrate this past New Year's Eve with her family. In attendance were my wife and I, her parents and grandparents, and her little sister who is in high school with her boyfriend. During the course of the family dinner the topic of politics and Iraq entered into the conversation. The issue of whether we should have invaded Iraq became the topic of interest. Here we were enjoying our roast pork and baked potato when my father-in-law mentions the present situation in Iraq. My wife's grandmother, who continues to be staunchly against the war mentions that "our soldiers shouldn't be there in the first place since they never found WMD." Her son, my father-in-law retorts: "Remember Bush (Jr.) gave a compelling speech at the UN that Saddam had weapons...they were not [abiding by the UN resolutions]." My grandmother retorts back, "But even Bush said they had faulty intelligence." I sat there as this banter went back and forth for several minutes going nowhere. I wanted to say something that would give better context and information to their discussion but I prudently decided to stay out of it. What I realized as I listened to their entire political conversation that evening was that it consisted only in sound bites and headlines filtered to them by the media. Not once did they question the source, or even attempt to examine each other's perspective; they did not look at other possibilities. In short, while they knew the news, they failed to decipher it and failed to examine the arguments which they presented. As a result, their conversation ended, like always, in a heated debate that prompted my little sister-in-law to sigh and exclaim, "Can we change the subject?"

This is a disturbing phenomenon that I believe is becoming more and more of a widespread trend in our society. While there are savvy news readers and watchers out there who take advantage of the Internet, watch McNeil & Lehr's News Hour and attempt to carefully unmask the true story behind the story, other Americans have become more passive, ensnared in partisan politics as a result of being forced fed by today's media bias. If I am right and this is the case, then what is public opinion worth when people cannot even formulate opinions of their own? How do we get to Yankelovich's public judgment? If people are just parroting the media and have allowed it to influence their opinions and perspectives, then public opinion is worth nothing since people are not thinking. Our ability to exercise free speech is diminished. While some argue that more cable news channels that offer varying perspectives does in fact reinforce freedom of opinion and of speech, it doesn't address my concern of thinking and pondering the news on our own. If there is anyone to blame it should be ourselves and not the media. If we cannot formulate our opinions and judgments, can we truly say we are fit to accept our civic responsibilities, i.e. voting? Do we really know the details behind a policy? If the answer is no, then that would be like marking our voting ballot blindfolded, the practice of which makes an absurdity of democracy.

How can we think more critically? How can we have a civil discourse about today's current events with civility and understanding? I decided to write this blog with this purpose in mind. In the coming postings I will attempt to the best of my ability to examine news stories that are affecting our times. I will endeavor to evaluate the stories critically, examining common and new angles. While no one can promise objectivity, I promise sensitivity and civility in my discussions in which I hope the reader will find sincere and compelling.

A little tidbit on the title: So why take a title of Alexander Dumas' heroic protagonist? Simple, as Edmund Dantes took on the alias of The Count of Monte Cristo, so do I. Keeping out of the public eye is a good thing as the the Medicis learned; so did Hamilton and Madison in their convincing and persuading of the Federalist Papers. Thus, I do the same. To know the author is to already bias the content. Therefore, the content is more important than the person.