The Bush Doctrine: Going Beyond Its Scope

As we approach the three year anniversary of the invasion of Iraq, it maybe difficult for most to trace back and understand how we found ourselves there in the first place. It is confusing since the motivations and reasons given by the Bush Administration to the American people to justify the war have changed at every contingency.

After 9/11, the justification was that Saddam Hussein presumably had links to al Qaeda, linking him to the War on Terror (which was unsubstantiated). Then, a reason not linked at all to terrorism, the administration strategically decided that it would be the right time to tell the world that Saddam was refusing to abide by the UN resolutions, denying entrance to nuclear inspectors (the IAEI). This action prompted former Secretary of State Powell to testify in front of the UN Security Council about possible hidden weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Most recently, our failure to uncover WMD compelled President Bush to reaffirm his decision to depose Saddam Hussein from power, again citing his tyranny against his people as his main reason why the cause was just. Today, the administration relies on establishing freedom and a constitutional government in Iraq as the basis for our continued military presence in the region.

My intention in writing this post is to examine the evolution of the Bush Doctrine; to explain how we went from pursuing Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda in Afghanistan to invading Iraq while simultaneously threatening North Korea and Iran in the process. In my analysis, I hope to illustrate and argue that the emergence of the Bush Doctrine purposefully and strategically broadened the definition of the War on Terror, thereby going beyond its scope, to include other enemies not necessarily linked to the 9/11 attacks, but enemies of the United States nonetheless. As a result, the Bush Doctrine completely redefined the War on Terror: broadening our list of potential enemies, turning it into a war of attrition without an end in sight.

From Terrorists to Iraq: The Evolution of the Bush Doctrine

In order to understand this evolution, it is important to go back three years ago and examine two critical addresses given by President Bush in Congress. The first was given on September 20, 2001, a few days shortly following the attacks on 9/11. The other speech was the State of the Union address on January 2002 where the president articulated what will be known as the "Bush Doctrine". These two speeches are of great importance since they give insight into how the Administration, in the early days following the terrorist attacks, attempt to define their response and provide clues to the genesis of the strategy that would ultimately become our foreign policy against terrorism. The first speech, known now at the White House website as the "Freedom of War with Fear", the president clearly identified (in my opinion, quite eloquently) the real enemy in the War on Terror: al Qaeda.

"Americans are asking: Who attacked our country? The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda...This group and its leader -- a person named Osama bin Laden -- are linked to many other organizations in different countries...They are recruited from their own nations and neighborhoods and brought to camps in places like Afghanistan, where they are trained in the tactics of terror. They are sent back to their homes or sent to hide in countries around the world to plot evil and destruction."

The speech articulated who the enemy was (al Qaeda), where the enemy would be (Afghanistan) and its supporter (the Taliban). If taken into proper context, the War on Terror's objectives were clearly identified and articulated. We were going into Afghanistan, have a quantitative method of measuring success in the number of al Qaeda leaders and members we arrest or kill and have the tools to develop a reasonable exit strategy out of Afghanistan. It also clearly stated the methods to hunt down al Qaeda members elsewhere by pursuing every means necessary "to...defeat...the global terror network." But the speech also left a critical loophole:

"Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated."

The explanation for this statement, with the benefit of hindsight we know now to be true, was the Administration's desire to leave the question of the policy against terrorism open-ended. Nevertheless, that speech, which will probably go down in history as President Bush's best speech, mentioned nothing about rogue nations, regimes, or weapons of mass destruction. The enemy was only Osama bin Laden and his global terrorist network.

Rogue nations, regimes, weapons of mass destruction, which can be aptly summarized as "the axis of evil" were only first disclosed in President Bush's next major speech, or the State of Union address, delivered four months after the "Freedom of War with Fear" speech. It was this speech that the president decided to elaborate more on his policy against terrorism. In an almost invisible and yet clever way, the president rhetorically tied fighting against al Qaeda in the Philippines, Pakistan and Bosnia to those governments that were lackadaisical about terrorism or that were unwilling to join us in our War on Terror stating:

"But some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will."

It is at this moment where the president articulates his policy which will be known as the Bush Doctrine. At the heart of the policy, he chooses to categorize any regime that sponsors terror just as culpable as the terrorists themselves and includes those governments possessing weapons mass destruction in the same category. At that moment, the Bush Doctrine was established as the policy that would drive the War on Terror. As a result, President Bush mentions North Korea and their armaments, Iran in their support of terrorists, and for the first time, we hear of Iraq: its plot to develop WMD and its supposed link to al Qaeda and terrorism.

In a matter of four months, between these two speeches, we went from declaring war against al Qaeda to those regimes that support them. In other words, more specifically, declared war on those groups and governments who have interests that are not favorable to our own. The Bush doctrine went beyond its scope. Rather than fighting those directly responsible for the attacks on 9/11, the Bush Doctrine pretentiously declared war on everyone else who supported terrorism or those who oppose America and its values. The Bush Doctrine, in defining the War on Terror as "us versus them", has inadvertently made it a war of ideology between democracy and fundamentalist (extremist) Islamic thought. This is the reason why I believe the average American is confused in trying to find the connection between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. The fact is that there is none. And it is no surprise that we have seen the administration for the past three years continue to attempt to convince the American people that there is a link among Saddam's regime and al Qaeda or that it has possession of WMD. For the most part until recently with the intelligence debacle, the administration has been able to make that argument stick. It was this point, that there was no connection between Iraq and al Qaeda, that Senator John Kerry failed to clearly articulate during the presidential election in 2004.

For Our Enemies Only

The Bush Doctrine, while going beyond its scope has also limited other governments from usrping it. Let's take Israel for example. The Bush Doctrine, on face value, should have given Ariel Sharon precedent to use force against the Palestinians, whom the Israelis consider as terrorists. If the policy is interpreted in the literal sense, Israel could take any action it deems necessary to protect its own security--to freely eliminate the Palestinians. If the Bush Doctrine ostensibly has given Sharon precedent to do whatever he wants, how did Secretary of State Rice persuade the conservative and hawkish Sharon from using force and then broker instead a deal to give control of the Gaza over to the Palestinians?

While the Bush Doctrine may appear to advocate regime vigilantism, it actually limits which regimes could be targeted. In this case, those who fall into the category of the "axis of evil" are those governments who illegally possess, are trying to posses, or proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The Palestinians, on the other hand, possess small arms, sticks and stones, and not WMD. It is my belief that Secretary of State Rice was successful in persuading Ariel Sharon to back down (and there is no question Israel possesses sufficient military might to eliminate the Palestinians) from starting a full-scale war against the Palestinians because of the difference in context stipulated in the Bush Doctrine. In this case, only the United States has the legitimate authority to effectively utilize the Bush Doctrine.

Bush Doctrine Tailored for Iraq?

Interestingly, this has got me thinking whether the Bush Doctrine was specifically tailored for Iraq. The more and more I thought about it, the more rational it was to me why the Bush Doctrine was designed the way it was. While 9/11 gave the administration legitimate reason to hunt down the terrorists, specifically al Qaeda, it is likely that those around Bush's circle at the time, (we all know who they are) Cheney, Rumsfeld and even Colin Powell saw 9/11 as a way to broaden the policy's scope to include our other enemies, mainly Iraq, North Korea, and Iran.

Everyone around Bush's circle, including Bush himself had reason to take down Saddam Hussein. The reason stems back to the first Gulf War. In 1991, Vice President Cheney was the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State Powell was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and both, as heads of the military operation in charge of the Persian Gulf War, were in no doubt frustrated that Saddam was allowed to retain power after the conflict. While Donald Rumsfeld remained in the private sector in 1991, as President Ford's former Chief of Staff and Secretary of State from 1975 to 1977, he witnessed the Socialist reforms being implemented by the Ba'ath Party in Iraq. There is no doubt in my mind that he was concerned about a rising socialist state within the Middle East in the middle of the Cold War, and having met with Saddam Hussein himself, Rumsfeld may have not held Saddam in high esteem. In 1991, current President George W. Bush supported his father in the victory in the Persian Gulf but clearly the attempted assassination of his father's life in Kuwait City shortly following the war instilled in him a personal resentment towards Saddam Hussein. Clearly, the Bush Administration from the very beginning had Iraq on its agenda.

Though it is speculation on my part, I believe the caveat on WMD was intended solely to deal with the Iraqi problem in the administration's eyes. If that was the administration's intent, then it worked only part way. Inevitably, we would enter Iraq without backing from the UN and to the censure of allies, France and Germany being the most prominent.

The Implications of the Bush Doctrine

The Bush Doctrine, since becoming policy has opened a Pandora's Box. We have decided to not only take on the terrorists but also those who support them. While the logic behind the Bush Doctrine makes sense, to use the analogy of killing a tree: it is better to tear its roots (stop its supporters) than hack off its branches (killing individual terrorists) to prevent other branches from growing, its logic (stopping al Qaeda/terrorism), however, does not work if we are hacking the wrong tree (in Iraq). Instead of pursuing al Qaeda in their own turf, we have invited them (al Zarqawi and friends) into Iraq where they contribute to much of the violence and instability, preventing us in fulfilling our own objectives in building a stable and free Iraq. While the president still claims that the decision to invade Iraq was the right choice since we are fighting the terrorist over there and not here at home, the fact is that we have just stirred the hornet's nest by inviting al Qaeda and other terrorists groups into Iraq. Rather than our troops being on the offensive, we are on the defensive, attempting to build and safeguard a government left by the political vacuum we created when deposing Saddam's regime. This may sound critical, but perhaps the reason why the president shies away when asked about a timetable in leaving Iraq is because al Qaeda and other terrorists in Iraq are really the ones who truly dictate whether our troops stay or leave.

While the Bush Doctrine assumes that you can't defeat the terrorist without also confronting the governments that support them, and this makes sense logically, one must admit that it has laid out a more difficult challenge for the United States in winning the War on Terror. Rather than limiting the scope, targeting specifically those terrorists who plotted the attacks on 9/11, we have taken upon ourselves, as a nation, the burden of eliminating all those we deem as foreign threats. Furthermore, we must identify the threat before it comes into fruition--the policy of pre-emption. As a result of the Bush Doctrine, on March 2003, we marched into Iraq unilaterally, based on flawed intelligence that there were weapons of mass destruction, without UN support, made up of only the "coalition of the willing", focused solely on deposing Saddam Hussein, and lacking a preconceived and well-thought exit strategy.

So that's where we find ourselves in Iraq today, our brave military fighting for the cause of freedom and liberty with death causalities nearing 2,200 of our finest young men and women in uniform.

Some Points to Ponder

So has the Bush Doctrine gone beyond its scope in the way that I defined it? Has President Bush, in setting out his policy that fateful day in January of 2002, make the right decision to define The War on Terror in the context of us against them? I wrote this post of the opinion that the Bush Doctrine did go beyond its scope, to explain why we ended up there and why we now face the complex challenges in Iraq.

In the end, I feel that the Bush Doctrine forced us into britches that were a little too big for us to fit. It has made measuring success in the War on Terror more difficult. It is one in which all succeeding presidents (should they decide to continue the policy) must call for continued patience, vigilance and more sacrifice of blood and national treasure. It has become a war in which Iraq, I fear, is only the beginning while North Korea and Iran wait nervously along the sidelines. It has made the War on Terror a war without timetables, one clearly lacking a definite end.

We've had three years to reflect. I welcome your comments.